I study the design of environmental policies for a regulator that has incomplete information on …rms' emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in cities with numerous small polluting sources). Because of incomplete information on emissions, there is no policy that can implement the …rst-best. Since the regulator can observe …rms' abatement technologies, however, it is possible to design a quasi-emissions trading program based on this information and show that it can provide higher welfare than command-andcontrol regulation such as technology or emission standards. I then empirically examine this claim using evidence from a particulate quasi-emissions trading program in Santiago, Chile.
Introduction
In recent years, environmental policy makers are paying more attention to environmental markets (i.e., emissions trading programs) as an alternative to the traditional command-and-control (CAC) approach of setting emission and technology standards. A notable example is the 1990 U.S. acid rain program that implemented a nationwide market for electric utilities' sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions (Schmalensee et al., 1998; Ellerman et al., 2000) . In order to have a precise estimate of the SO 2 emissions that are actually going to the atmosphere, the acid rain program requires each a¤ected electric utility unit to install costly equipment that can continuously monitor emissions. 1 This and other market experiences suggest that conventional emissions trading programs are likely to be implemented in those cases where emissions can be closely monitored, which almost exclusively occurs in large stationary sources like electric power plants and re…neries.
Then, it is not surprising that, among other reasons, environmental authorities continue relying on CAC instruments to regulate emissions from smaller sources because compliance with such instruments only requires the authority to ensure that the regulated source has installed the required abatement technology or that its emissions per unit of output are equal or lower than a certain emissions rate standard. 2 In addition, some regulators view that a trading program where emissions cannot be closely observed is likely to result in higher emissions than under an alternative CAC regulation because the former provides …rms with more incentives to alter 1 Another example with similar monitoring requirements is the Southern California RECLAIM program that implemented separated markets for nitrogen oxide (NO x ) and SO 2 emissions from power plants, re…neries and other large stationary sources. This program did not include a market for volatile organic compounds (VOC) in large part because of the di¢culties with monitoring actual emissions from smaller and heterogeneous sources (Harrison, 1999) . 2 Note that there are some credit-based trading programs aimed at curbing air pollution in urban areas working in the US (Tietenberg, 1985) . New sources (or expansion of existing ones) must acquire emission credits to cover their emissions through, for example, shutting down existing plants or scrapping old vehicles. Although these programs have the merit of involving small sources, they are very limited in scope in the sense that they are embedded within an existing CAC regulation and are particularly designed to prevent further deterioration of air quality from the entry of new sources. their output and hence their actual emissions. 3 Thus, it appears that environmental markets are not suitable for e¤ectively reducing air pollution in cities such as Santiago-Chile or Mexico City where emissions come from many small (stationary and mobile) sources rather than a few large stationary sources. For example, it would be prohibitively costly to require operators of central heating systems in residential or commercial buildings to install continuous emission monitoring equipment. Through annual inspections, however, the regulator could monitor boilers' size, combustion technology, fuel type and emissions rate as he would precisely do under CAC regulation. But since the regulator does not observe the total number of hours boilers are operated during the year, he would certainly have imperfect estimates of boilers' actual emissions.
Rather than disregard environmental markets as a policy tool, I think the challenge faced by policy makers in cities su¤ering similar air quality problems is when and how to implement these markets using monitoring procedures that are similar to those under CAC regulation. While the literature provides little guidance on how to approach this challenge, 4 it is interesting to observe that despite its incomplete information on each source's actual emissions, SantiagoChile's environmental agency has already implemented a market to control total suspended particulate (TSP) emissions from a group of about 600 stationary sources (Montero et al., 2002) .
Based on estimates from annual inspection for technology parameters such as source's size and fuel type, Santiago's environmental regulator approximates each source's actual emissions by the maximum amount of emissions that the source could potentially emit in a given year. 5 3 Several conversations during 2000 and 2001 with some regulators at Chile's National Commission for the Environment. 4 In his survey, Lewis (1996) brie ‡y mentions the implications of imperfect monitoring on instrument design. Lewis and Sappington (1992) study a similar situation in which a regulator cannot observe the quality of service (e.g., energy conservation) o¤ered by a public utility. In addition, Fullerton and West (forthcoming) discuss the use of taxes on cars and on gasoline as an alternative to an unavailable tax on emissions. 5 The authority incorrectly assumed that by using the source's maximum emissions as a proxy it would prevent perverse incentives that could result in higher emissions. As we shall see, the choice of proxy is an arbitrary matter because the number of permits being allocated can always be adjusted accordingly with no e¢ciency e¤ects.
I believe that a close (theoretical and empirical) examination of this quasi-emissions trading program represents a unique case study of issues of instrument choice and design that can arise in the practical implementation of environmental markets in which regulators face important information asymmetries and have a limited number of policy instruments (e.g., cannot make transfers from or to …rms). 6 Since a¤ected sources under Santiago's quasi-emissions trading program (hereafter, the TSP In the next section (Section 2) I develop a theoretical model and start by showing that the regulator can only implement second-best policies when emissions are not directly monitored (I use the term second-best in a loosely way to refer to any policy that provides net bene…ts that are positive but lower than those provided by a …rst-best policy). In Section 3, I derive the optimal design for two of such second-best policies: emission standards and quasi-emission 6 More generally, this paper is related to Baker (1992) on how to design a contract (which in this case is a regulatory instrument) when performance is only imperfectly measured. 7 It may be also relevant to ask about the bene…ts of allowing interpollutant trading. See Montero (2001) for a discussion.
permits.
In Section 4, I discuss the conditions under which permits provides higher welfare than standards. I show that the permits policy not only provide …rms with ‡exibility to reduce production and abatement costs (e.g., high cost abatement …rms can buy permits instead of installing abatement technologies) but also may create perverse incentives for …rms to choose socially suboptimal combinations of output and abatement ex-post (i.e., once the regulation is in place). There are two situations in which the latter e¤ect can lead the permits policy to higher emissions, and hence, be potentially welfare dominated by the standards policy: (1) when …rms with relatively large ex-ante levels of output are choosing low levels of abatement (i.e., when there is a negative correlation between production and abatement costs), and (2) when …rms choosing higher levels of abatement …nd it optimal to reduce output ex-post. Because in theory it is not possible to rule out neither situation, in deciding whether or not to use a quasi-emissions trading program, the regulator will inevitably face a trade-o¤ between cost savings and possible higher emissions.
In Section 5, I empirically examine the advantages of a quasi-emissions trading program using emissions and output data from the TSP program. I …nd strong evidence of cost savings and no increase in e¤ective emissions relative to what would have been observed under an alternative standards policy. The main reason driving this result is that …rms making larger reductions are, on average, increasing their utilization relative to other …rms. This empirical …nding seems to be more general than one may think. Firms choosing abatement investments with proportionally large …xed/sunk costs (e.g., installing end-of-pipe technologies) not only make larger reductions but also enjoy lower ex-post marginal abatement costs (ex-ante marginal abatement costs should be similar at the margin), so their ex-post marginal production costs is relatively lower, and hence, their utilization relatively higher. 8 Finally, in Section 6, I discuss some policy implications and conclude by arguing that the results of this paper make a strong case for the wider use of tradeable permits even in those situations in which emissions are imperfectly observed. Furthermore, I suggest that permits should be adopted as a default, unless the available cost information indicates the opposite. In other words, the burden of proof should lie with the CAC policy and not with the permits policy.
The Model
Consider a competitive market for an homogeneous good supplied by a continuum of …rms of mass 1. Each …rm produces output q and emissions e of a uniform ‡ow pollutant. To simplify notation, I assume that when the …rm does not utilize any pollution abatement device e = q.
Market inverse demand is given by P = P (Q), where Q is total output and P 0 (Q) < 0. Total damage from pollution is given by D(E), where E are total emissions and D 0 (E) > 0. Functions P (Q) and D(E) are known to the regulator.
A …rm can abate pollution at a positive cost by installing technology x, which reduces emissions from q to e = (1 ¡ x)q. Hence, the …rm's emission rate is e=q = 1 ¡ x. Each …rm is represented by a pair of cost parameters (¯;°). A …rm of type (¯;°) has a cost function C(q; x;¯;°) where¯and°are unknown to the regulator. To keep the model mathematically tractable I assume that the cost function has the following quadratic form
8 The SO2 trading system of the 1990 US acid rain program provides strong evidence on this as well. A¤ected sources retro…tted with scrubbers (end-of-pipe technologies that can reduce up to 95% of the emissions coming out of the stack) experienced a noticeably increase in utilization relative to a¤ected sources that switched to lower sulfur coals or simply did not abate emissions (Ellerman et al., 2000, pp. 334-341). where c, k and v are known parameters common to all …rms satisfying c¸0, k¸0, ¤ḱ c ¡ v 2 > 0 and v T 0. 9 The interaction term in (1), vxq, has an essential role in the model since it captures the e¤ect of abatement on ex-post (i.e., after the regulation) output. Since we have constrained v to be the same for all …rms, a negative value of v would indicate, for example, that, on average, the larger the x the larger the q, ceteris paribus. 10 Thus, our cost function satis…es C q > 0, C qq¸0 , C x > 0, C xx¸0 , and C qx T 0 in the relevant range (recall that C y´@ C=@y).
Although the regulator does not observe …rms' individual values for¯and°, we assume that he knows that they are distributed according to the cumulative joint distribution F (¯;°)
. Without any loss of generality I let
where E[¢] is the expected value operator and f(¯;°)´d 2 F (¯;°)=d¯d°is the joint probability distribution. 11 that when production and abatement costs are positively correlated (i.e., ½¯°> 0), …rms with relatively large ex-ante levels of output (i.e., …rms with low¯) are more likely to choose high levels of abatement, so the possibility of higher emissions under the permits policy is reduced.
In addition, when …rms are rather heterogeneous (i.e., large values of ¾ 2 and ¾ 2°) cost savings 9 The parameter v can be negative, for example, if switching to a cleaner fuel saves on fuel costs but involves such a large retro…tting cost (i.e., high k) that no …rm switches to the cleaner and cheaper fuel unless regulated.
1 0 Ideally, one would like a richer model in which v = ± can vary across …rms, where ± > 0 is the …rm's private information drawn over some known interval [±; ±] and according to some known cumulative distribution. Then, a positive correlation between°and ± would produce that a higher x leads to an ex-post higher q. Solving that model, however, requires numerical techniques. Although my simpler formulation can produce a peculiar intermediate result (average utilization may go up with the regulation if v < 0), it does not biased the results of the paper in any particular way. This situation can be avoided by simply re-writing the interaction term vxq as (w + vx)q where w = 0 if x = 0 and w + v¸0 if x > 0. 1 1 Because¯and°take negative values for some …rms, I work with parameter values (including parameters in demand and damage functions) such that marginal costs are always positive, that is @C=@q > 0 and @C=@x > 0 for all¯and°. under permits are likely to be signi…cant.
Firms behave competitively, taking the output clearing price P as given. Hence, in the absence of any environmental regulation, each …rm will produce to the point where its marginal production cost equals the product price (i.e., C q (q; x;¯;°) = P ), and install no abatement technology (i.e., x = 0). Because production involves some pollution, this market equilibrium is not socially optimal. The regulator's problem is then to design a regulation that maximizes social welfare.
I let the regulator's social welfare function be
where Q = R¯R°q (¯;°)fd¯d°is total output and E = R¯R°( 1 ¡ x(¯;°))q(¢)fd¯d°is total emissions. In this welfare function, the regulator does not di¤erentiate between consumer and producer surplus and transfers from or to …rms are lump-sum transfers between consumers and …rms with no welfare e¤ects. 12 The …rms' outputs and abatement technologies that implement the social optimum or …rst-best outcome are given by the following two …rst-order conditions
If rearranged, eq. (4) says that the bene…ts from consuming an additional (small) unit of output 1 2 The model can be generalized by allowing the regulator to consider a weight ® 6 = 1 for …rm pro…ts and a shadow cost¸> 0 for public funds. However, this would not add much to our discussion. is equal to its cost of production and environmental e¤ects. Eq (5), on the other hand, says that emissions should be reduced to the point where the marginal cost of emissions abatement (i.e., C x =q) is equal to marginal damages (i.e., D 0 (E)).
However, because of various information asymmetries between …rms and the regulator, it is not clear that the latter can design an environmental policy that can attain the …rst-best outcome. The regulator's problem then becomes to maximize (3) subject to information constraints (and sometimes administrative and political constraints as well). From the various possible type of information constraints, it is useful to discuss brie ‡y the case where the regulator knows little or nothing about …rms' costs (i.e., he may or may not have any prior about the joint distribution of¯and°) but can costlessly monitor each …rm's actual emissions e. This is the case that have attracted most attention in the literature (Lewis, 1996) . When the regulator can estimate e either directly from continuous monitoring equipment or indirectly from observations of both x and q, it is not di¢cult to show that despite the fact that he knows nothing about …rms' costs he can still implement the …rst-best by announcing a (non-linear) emissions tax schedule ¿ (E) equal to D 0 (E). 13 This regulatory mechanism is simpler than those proposed by Kwerel (1977) , Dasgupta et al. (1980) and Spulber (1988) in the sense that does not require incentive compatibility and transfers to …rms. In fact, Kwerel's (1977) mechanism considers two instruments: grandfathered permits and subsidies to …rms holding permits in excess of their emissions. Dasgupta et al. (1980) and Spulber (1988) , on the other hand, designs consider non-linear transfer to …rms based upon the …rms' (truthful) revelation of their costs parameters. 14 In case the regulator 1 3 I must say that this assertion is not new and its proof is quite straightforward. A competitive …rm (¯;°) takes the price P (Q) and tax rate ¿ (E) = D 0 (E) as given and maximize ¼(q; x;¯;°) = P (Q)q ¡ C(q; x;¯;°) ¡ D 0 (E) ¢ (1 ¡ x)q with respect to q and x. The …rm's …rst order conditions for q and x are those given by (4) and (5). 1 4 One di¤erence with Dasgupta et al. (1980) is that in their design telling the truth is a dominant strategy. In this non-linear price design ¿ (E), the …rst-best outcome is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (i.e., it will be attained if each …rm acts rationally and believes that the other …rms are doing so). In addition, Dasgupta et al.'s (1980) has some aggregate information about …rms' costs (i.e., he knows that¯and°are jointly distributed according to F on¯2 [¯;¯] and°2 [°;°]), the policy design becomes even simpler because aggregate uncertainty is eliminated. The regulator can either levy an emissions tax ¿ = D 0 (E ¤ ) or distribute a total of E ¤ tradeable emissions permits, where E ¤ is equal to the total number of emissions at the social optimum.
In this paper, however, I am interested in the regulatory problem where the regulator cannot directly observe …rms' actual emissions e = (1 ¡ x)q; although he can costlessly monitor …rms' abatement technologies or emissions rates x. As in Santiago's quasi-emissions trading program, this information asymmetry will be present when both continuous monitoring equipment is prohibitively costly (or technically unfeasible) and individual output q is not observable. 15 Thus, if the regulator asks for an output report from the …rm, we anticipate that the …rm would misreport its output whenever this was to its advantage. In this case, the regulator cannot implement the social optimum regardless of the information he or she has about …rm's costs. 16 Even if the regulator has perfect knowledge of …rm's costs and, therefore, can ex-post deduce …rm's output based on this information and the observation of x, the fact that he cannot make the policy contingent on either emissions or output prevents him from implementing the …rst best. In other words, the regulator cannot induce the optimal amounts of output and emissions with only one instrument (i.e., x). 17 Consequently, the regulator must necessarily content mechanism does not rely on perfect competition as ¿ (E) does. 1 5 The regulator can nevertheless estimate total output Q from the observation of the market clearing price P . 1 6 Consider the extreme situation in which regulator knows both¯and°. His optimal policy will be some function T (x;¯;°) in the form of either a transfer from the …rm or to the …rm. Then, …rm (¯;°) takes P (Q) and T (x;¯;°) as given and maximizes ¼(q; x;¯;°) = P (Q)q ¡ C(q; x;¯;°) ¡ T (x;¯;°) with respect to q and x. It is not di¢cult to see that …rm's …rst order conditions for q and x will always di¤er from (4) and (5) for any function T (x;¯;°).
himself with "second-best" policies. In the next two sections I discuss how to design and chose among some of those policies.
Second-best policy designs
Rather than consider all possible "second-best" policies, I focus on those policies that are either currently implemented or have drawn some degree of attention from policy makers in the context of urban air pollution control. I …rst study the optimal design of a traditional technology (or emission) standard and then the optimal design of a quasi-emissions trading system. 18 To keep the model mathematically tractable, I make two further simpli…cations regarding the demand curve and the damage function. I let P (Q) = P (constant) and D(E) = hE, where h > v. 19 To visualize how the two policy designs depart from the social optimum, it is useful to compute the …rst-best and keep it as a benchmark. Plugging the above assumptions in (4) and (5), the …rst-best outcome is given by
It is immediate that @x ¤ =@¯< 0, @x ¤ =@°< 0, @q ¤ =@¯< 0 and @q ¤ =@°< 0. As expected, higher production and abatement costs lead to lower output and abatement levels.
Standards
The regulator's problem here is to …nd the technology (or performance) standard x s to be required to all …rms that maximizes social welfare (subscript "s" denotes standards policy). 20 The regulator knows that for any given x s , …rm (¯;°) will maximize ¼(q; x s ;¯;°) = P q ¡ C(q; x s ;¯;°). Hence, …rm's (¯;°) output decision will solve the …rst-order condition
which provides the regulator with …rm's output q as a function of the standard x s
Since x s will be the same across …rms, it is clear that production under a standard will also be suboptimal relative to the …rst-best q ¤ as q s does not adapt to changes in°.
Based on the welfare function (3), the regulator now solves
y the envelope theorem, the …rst-order condition is
By replacing (8) and @q s =@x s = ¡v=c into (9) and using (2), the …rst-order condition (9) reduces 2 0 Although in practice the regulator sets the emission standards s = 1 ¡ xs, it is simpler to solve for xs than 1 ¡ xs.
Thus, the optimal technology standards becomes
where ¤´ck ¡ v 2 > 0. Comparing this result to the …rst-best (6), it is interesting to observe that x s > x ¤ (¯= 0;°= 0). This indicates that even in the absence of production and abatement cost heterogeneity (i.e.,¯=°= 0 for all …rms), the standards policy still require …rms to install more abatement technology than is socially optimal. Because q s (x ¤ ) > q ¤ , it is optimal to set x s somewhat above x ¤ to bring output q s closer to its optimal level q ¤ .
Tradeable quasi-emission permits
The regulator's problem now is to …nd the total number of quasi-emission permits e e 0 to be distributed among …rms that maximizes social welfare. Let R denote the equilibrium price of permits, which will be determined shortly. 21 The regulator knows that …rm (¯;°) will take R as given and solve
where e e = (1 ¡ x)e q are …rm's quasi-emissions and e q is some arbitrarily output or capacity level that is common to all …rms. For example, e q could be set equal to the maximum possible output 2 1 Note that under a tax policy, the optimal price R will be the quasi-emissions tax. Because there is no aggregate uncertainty in this model, both policies will be equivalent from an e¢ciency standpoint. that could ever be observed, which would occur when x = 0 and¯=¯. As we shall see later, the exact value of e q turns out to be irrelevant because it simply works as a scaling factor. Note that if e e < e e 0 the …rm will be a seller of permits.
From …rms' …rst-order conditions
we have that …rm's (¯;°) optimal abatement and output responses to R and e q (or, more precisely, to Re q) are
where the subscript "p" denotes permits policy. Comparing (13) and (14) with (6) and (7) illustrates the trade-o¤ a regulator faces when implementing a quasi-emissions trading program.
While @q p =@¯and @x p =@°are negative as in the …rst-best, @q p =@°and @x p =@¯are both positive when v > 0. 22 Now we can solve the regulator's problem of …nding the optimal e e 0 . Since the market clearing condition is
and x p is a function of Re q as indicated by (13), it is irrelevant whether we solve for Re q or e e 0 =e q.
Hence, we let the regulator solve (permits purchases and sales are transfers with no net welfare e¤ects)
y the envelope theorem, the …rst-order condition can be written as (13) and (14) into (16) and using (2), the …rst-order condition can be rearranged to obtain the optimal permits price
which, in turn, allows us to obtain the optimal permits allocation e e 0 =e q by simply replacing (17) in (13) and that in (15) .
More interesting, we can replace Re q in (13) and (14) to obtain expressions for q p and x p that are more readily comparable to q s and x s (see eqs. (8) and (10)). After some algebra, the following expressions are obtained
If …rms are homogeneous (i.e.,¯=°= 0 for all …rms), it is not surprising that x p = x s and q p = q s and that both regulations provide the same welfare. As …rms become more heterogenous,
x and q move in di¤erent directions depending on the regulatory regime. For example, as …rms di¤erentiate along their abatement costs (di¤erent°'s), …rms' abatement decisions x tend to remain closer to the social optimum x ¤ under the permits regulation than under the CAC regulation since @x ¤ =@°and @x p =@°are both negative. 23 However, as …rms di¤erentiate along their production costs (di¤erent¯'s) and v is assumed positive, …rms' abatement decisions remain closer to x ¤ under the CAC regulation since @x ¤ =@°and @x p =@°have opposite signs. A similar trade-o¤ can be found analyzing …rms' production decisions to changes in¯and°. Put di¤erently, permits provide …rms with abatement ‡exibility (e.g., …rms with high abatement costs can buy permits instead of installing pollution control equipment) but may generate greater incentives to shift output and abatement (and hence emissions) further away form their …rst-best levels. Because this output/abatement "misalignment" may result in higher emissions under the permits policy, in deciding whether or not to use a quasi-emissions trading program, the regulator will inevitably face a trade-o¤ between abatement ‡exibility and possible higher emissions. I study this trade-o¤ more formally in the next section.
A second-best policy choice
To …nd which policy should be adopted by a welfare maximizing regulator, we start by writing the di¤erence between the social welfare achieved by the permits policy and by the standards 2 3 Note that @x ¤ =@°= @xp=@°for v = 0.
where e e 0 is the optimal number of quasi-emission permits normalized by some e q and x s is the optimal standard. The normative implication of (20) is that if ¢ ps > 0, the regulator should implement the quasi-emissions trading policy.
To explore under which conditions this is the case, we write (20) as
where q p , x p , q s and x s can be expressed according to (18) and (19). Since Q p = Q s = (P ¡ vx s )=c, eq. (21) can be re-written as
Recalling that e = (1¡ x)q, the …rst curly bracket of the right hand side of (22) is the di¤erence in costs between the two policies, whereas the second curly bracket is the di¤erence in emissions that multiplied by h gives the di¤erence in environmental damages.
Let us …rst examine the case in which Cov[¯;°]´½¯°¾¯¾°= 0. By plugging (2), (18) and (19) into (22), after some algebra (22) becomes
and after collecting terms, it reduces to
where A 1 = (v 2 ¤ ¡ 2kcvh)=2c¤ 2 and A 2 = (c¤ ¡ 2vch)=2¤ 2 . Since these coe¢cients can be either positive, negative or zero, 24 the sign of (24) will depend upon the value of the di¤erent parameters. As the heterogeneity across …rms decreases (i.e., ¾ 2 and ¾ 2°) , however, the welfare di¤erence between the two policies tend to disappear.
The ambiguous sign of (24) should not be surprising given the trade-o¤ between ‡exibility and higher emissions that we identi…ed in the previous section. Expression (23) illustrates this trade-o¤ more clearly. The …rst term is the di¤erence in costs between the two policies, which is always positive. The second term is the di¤erence in damages, which can either be positive, negative or zero depending on the value of v. Hence, a quasi-emissions trading policy will always lead to cost savings but it can also lead to higher emissions unless v · 0.
The simplest way to illustrate how ¢ ps varies with changes in the value of the di¤erent parameters is to focus on v. If v is zero (negative), A 1 is zero (positive) and A 2 is positive;
hence, ¢ ps is always positive. If v > 0, however, A 1 is negative and A 2 can be either positive or negative; hence, the sign of ¢ ps remains ambiguous. Further, since h > v, it is possible to show that @¢ ps =@v < 0, so there is a critical value v c = v c (c; k; h; ¾¯; ¾°) > 0 for which ¢ ps = 0. 25
To interpret this result one must recognized that a quasi-emissions trading program can create "perverse" incentives for shifting output from cleaner to dirtier …rms resulting in higher total emissions. A low value of v, however, reduces both the e¤ect of the environmental regulation on the …rm's output under either policy (see (8) and (14)) and the e¤ect of production 2 4 Recall that for interior solutions in all cases we must have kc > (h ¡ v) 2 , kc > v 2 , and h > v. 2 5 Note from second order conditions that if v c > p kc or v c > h, ¢ ps will be always positive. On the other hand, if vc < h ¡ p kc and h ¡ p kc > 0, ¢ps will be always negative.
cost heterogeneity (i.e.,¯) on …rms' abatement decisions under the permits policy (see (13) ).
In fact, when v = 0 the regulation has no e¤ect on utilization and total emissions are equal under either policy. 26 Hence, total savings from trading are based exclusively on abatement cost heterogeneity and equal to ¢ ps = ¾ 2°= 2k.
A comparative statics analysis for v c (c; k; h; ¾¯; ¾°) yields ambiguous signs for all parameters but for h and ¾¯, in which case we have @v c =@h < 0 and @v c =@¾¯< 0. 27 While it is immediate from (23) that a higher marginal damage reduces v c , it is not so immediate that higher production cost heterogeneity also reduces v c . 28 The reason is that when v > 0 higher production cost heterogeneity (i.e., higher ¾¯) leads to higher output misalignment (i.e., further away from the …rst-best) and hence higher emissions under permits than under standards (i.e., q s closer to q ¤ than q p ). When v < 0, conversely, production cost heterogeneity leads to less output misalignment under the permits policy. In addition, it is interesting to notice that because @v c =@¾°is of ambiguous sign, higher abatement cost heterogeneity (i.e., higher ¾°) does not necessarily lead to higher ¢ ps when v > 0. This is because higher abatement heterogeneity may exacerbate the shifting of output from cleaner to dirtier …rms.
Let us now relax the assumption that ½¯°= 0. In this case (24) expands to
where
Thus, the advantage of quasi-emission permits increases when¯and°are positively correlated (i.e., ½¯°> 0). This occurs because when 2 6 Note that under a conventional emissions trading program output is a¤ected by the regulation even if v = 0 because actual emissions depend on output. 2 7 To …nd @v c =@h, for example, we make ¢ ps = 0 and implicitely di¤erentiate with respect to h to obtain
hich is obviously negative since h > vc for an interior solution. 2 8 Note that if v < 0, @¢ps=@¾¯> 0.
both cost parameters (¯and°) are either simultaneously high or low, output and abatement remain closer to the …rst-best. For example, we know that a high°leads to too much output q p (@q p =@°> 0) but because¯is also high, q p does not increase as much as if¯were, on average, zero. Similarly, we know that a high¯leads to too much abatement (@x p =@¯> 0)
but because°is also high, x p does not go up as much. Note that if ½¯°< 0, ¢ ps can still be positive provided that v < v c . As before, it is possible to …nd a critical value ½ c°< 0 for which ¢ ps = 0 when v = 0. These results can be summarized in the following proposition As v and ½¯°are likely to vary from case to case, 29 there may be cases in which standards are the correct policy choice. However, if we believe that in the absence of any cost information the reasonable values to assume for v and ½¯°should be around zero (or centered around zero), Proposition 1 suggests that the permits policy should be adopted as a default, unless relevant cost data could be gathered to indicate the opposite. In other words, the burden of proof should lie with the standards policy and not with the permits policy.
An Empirical Evaluation
The theoretical analysis indicates that whether an quasi-emissions trading program provides higher welfare than a traditional command-and-control approach is an empirical question. I use the experience from Santiago's total suspended particulate emissions (TSP) trading program to answer such question for at least one particular case and draw, if possible, more general policy lessons. Because …rms are not required to provide the regulator with information on production and abatement costs, to test the advantages of the TSP program I apply the theoretical framework previously developed to information other than cost such as emission rates and utilization.
The TSP program
The city of Santiago has constantly presented air pollution problems since the early 1980s.
The TSP trading program, established in March of 1992, was designed to curb TSP emissions from the largest stationary sources in Santiago (industrial boilers, industrial ovens, and large residential and commercial heaters) whose emissions are discharged through a duct or stack at a maximum ‡ow rate greater than or equal to 1,000 m 3 /hr. Because sources were too small to require sophisticated monitoring procedures, the authority did not design the program based on sources' actual emissions but on a proxy variable equal to the maximum emissions that a source could emit in a given period of time if it operates without interruption.
The quasi-emissions variable (expressed in kg of TSP per day) used by the authority in this particular program was de…ned as the product of emissions concentration (in mg/m 3 ) and maximum ‡ow rate (in m 3 /hrs) of the gas exiting the source's stack (multiplied by 24 hrs and 10 ¡6 kg/mg to obtain kg/day). 30 Although the regulatory authority monitors each a¤ected source's concentration and maximum ‡ow rate once a year, quasi-emissions and permits are expressed in daily terms to be compatible with the daily TSP air quality standards. Thus, a source that holds one quasi-emissions permit has the right to emit a maximum of 1 kg of TSP per day inde…nitely over the lifetime of the program.
3 0 In terms of our model, this is equivalent as to make e q equal to the maximum possible output, which in our case is (P ¡¯)=c. But note that the program would have worked equally well with an either higher or lower e q. The use of a di¤erent e q only requires to adjust the number of quasi-permits e e0 to be distributed such that Re q remains at its optimal level. Sources registered and operating by March 1992 were designated as existing sources and received grandfathered permits equal to the product of an emissions rate of 56 mg/m 3 and their maximum ‡ow rate at the moment of registration. New sources, on the other hand, receive no permits, so must cover all their quasi-emissions with permits bought from existing sources. The total number of permits distributed (i.e., the emissions cap) was 64% of aggregate quasi-emissions from existing sources prior to the program. After each annual inspection, the authority proceeds to reconcile the estimated quasi-emissions with the number of permits held by each source (all permits are traded at a 1:1 ratio). Note that despite permits are expressed in daily terms, the monitoring frequency restricts sources to trade permits only on an annual or permanent basis. 31 
The data
The data for the study was obtained from PROCEFF's databases for the years 1993 through 1999. 32 Each database includes information on the number of sources and their dates of registration, maximum ‡ow rates, fuel types, emissions rates and utilization (i.e., days and hours of operation during the year). While information on maximum ‡ow rates, fuel types and emissions rates is directly obtained by the authority during its annual inspections, information on utilization is obtained from …rms' own reports. 33 The 1993 database contains all the information, including the ‡ow rate used to calculate each source's allocation of permits, before the program became e¤ective in 1994. Table 1 presents a summary of the data. The …rst two rows show that the exit and entry of sources has been quite signi…cant. By 1999 36% of the a¤ected sources were new sources despite the fact they did not receive any permits.
In order to comply with the TSP trading program, a¤ected sources can hold permits, reduce emissions or do both. They can reduce emissions by either decreasing their size (i.e., maximum ‡ow rate) or their emissions rates, through either fuel switching (for example, from wood, coal, or heavy oil to light oil, liquid gas, or natural gas) or the installation of end-of-pipe technology such as …lters, electrostatic precipitators, cyclones, and scrubbers. Sources do not gain anything, in terms of emissions reduction, by changing their utilization level (i.e., days and hrs of operation), because by de…nition it is assumed to be at 100%. Given that the authority controls for the size of the source at the moment of permits allocation and emissions monitoring, in terms of our theoretical model changes in emission rates would be captured by the variable x p and utilization by the variable q p .
The next rows of Table 1 show data on ‡ow rates, emission rates and utilization. The large standard deviations show that these three variables vary widely across sources in all years. 34 As the 1993 numbers indicate, sources' utilization was quite heterogeneous before the The last two rows of Table 1 show data on total quasi-emissions and quasi-emissions permits. 35 Although 1994 was in principle the …rst year of compliance with the program, trading 3 4 It may seem strange to observe some ‡ow rates below the 1,000 (m 3 /hr) mark. In general, these are existing sources for which their ‡ow rates were wrongly estimated above 1,000 (m 3 /h) at the time of registration. Nevertheless, these sources chose to remain in the program to keep the permits they had already received. 3 5 A few permits were retired from the market in 1997 as the authority revised the eligibility of some sources to receiving permits (Montero et al., 2002 ). activity did not occur until the end of 1996 because of evident enforcement problems. The emissions goal of the TSP program was only achieved by 1997 (total quasi-emissions below total permits); year after which natural gas became available from Argentina at unexpectedly attractive prices that many a¤ected sources switched to this cleaner fuel leaving the quasi-emissions cap of 4,087.5 permits largely unbinding. This is consistent with the fact that all TSP trading activity took place from end of 1996 to middle of 1998 with prices steadily declining from 17,000 to 3,000 US$/permit. 36 In the next section we take a closer look at these data and test whether an equivalent command-and-control approach would have provided higher welfare.
Model implementation
According to Proposition 1, a quasi-trading program is likely to provide higher bene…ts than a equivalent CAC program when both v and ½¯°are small or negative and positive respectively.
In an attempt to determined the sign of ¢ ps , I start with an econometric estimation of the sign and magnitude of v and o¤er some hints about the sign of ½¯°. I leave for the following subsection a fuller estimation of ¢ ps .
Based on …rst order conditions (11) and (12), v can be computed by estimating the following simultaneous-equation system
where x i p is source i's the level of abatement (under the permits policy), q i p is output, z i is a variable (or group of variables) that captures abatement costs so that a 0 + a 2 z i = Re q=k ¡°i=k, 
where i indexes sources; t indexes years; " it and u it are error terms whose characteristics will be discussed shortly; and the chosen variables relate to those in (26)-(27) as follows. The variable x p is captured by REDUC which is equal to the percentage reduction of a source's emissions rate, EMRT E, from its emissions rate in 1995, EM RT E95. Thus, source i's reduction in period t is given by REDUC it = (EMRT E95 i ¡ EMRT E it )=EMRT E95 i . Because I am taking EMRT E95 as a proxy for the rate that would have been observed in the absence of the level TSP program (i.e., counterfactual rate), REDUC must be equal or greater than zero (by construction cannot be greater than one as well) if input prices are assumed unchanged as in our theoretical model. However, in a more general equilibrium setting where the relative price of some dirtier inputs may go down after the introduction of the TSP program, it is possible to observe a few sources for which REDUC it < 0. 38
The variable q p is captured by UT IL which is a source's utilization rate. As in the theoretical model, TSP program's authority does not observe UT IL, and therefore, she cannot use it for monitoring and enforcement purposes. Put it di¤erently, because the regulator only observes source's ‡ow rate, F LOW RT E, and emissions rate, EMRT E, she has only control over changes in emissions due to changes in source's size (i.e., F LOW RT E) and emission rates but not over changes in emissions due to changes in utilization.
F LOW RT E and the time-invariant variables EMRT E95, ENDP IP E, INDUST and
ST AT E and are intended to capture di¤erences in abatement costs across sources. If there are any scale economies associated with pollution abatement we should expect more abatement from bigger sources (i.e., larger F LOW RT E), other things equal. 39 Similarly, I expect that a source that starts from a high emission rate (i.e., high EMRT E95) should face more abatement possibilities and hence lower costs. Conversely, I expect a source already equipped with some end-of-pipe abatement technology required by previous regulation to be less likely to reduce emissions. Hence, I introduce the dummy variable ENDP IP E that equals 1 if the 3 8 In cases of either lacking or obviously incorrect information on EMRT E95, I proceed as follows: I use EMRT E93 instead of EM RT E95 for 10 sources, EMRT E96 instead of EM RT E95 for 3 sources and eliminated 7 sources for which their EMRT E have increased more than 50% relative to their counterfactual rate (i.e., EMRT E95). Note that results do not change when I include 3 additional …rms for which EM RT E have increase between 50 and 100%. Results do substantially change when I include the 4 additional sources for which their EM RT E's have increased somewhere between 100 and 2500% times relative to their counterfactuals. 3 9 To address any endogeneity concerns about F LOW RT E, I run the same regressions with F LOW RT Eit = F LOW RT E95i for all t and obtain virtually identical results.
source has any type of end-of-pipe abatement technology by 1995. I also introduce the dummy variables INDUST and ST AT E to see whether there is any di¤erence in abatement costs (or abatement behavior) between industrial sources (INDUST = 1) and residential/commercial sources, and between state or municipality owned sources (ST AT E = 1) and privately owned sources. 40 Since it is reasonable to think that privately owned and industrial sources should be more responsive to changes in factor prices after the introduction of the TSP program than other sources, I expect the coe¢cients of INDUST and ST AT E to be positive and negative, respectively.
The variable UT IL95 in (29) is the source's utilization in 1995 and serves as a proxy for the level of utilization that would have been observed in the absence of the TSP program and other exogenous factors. Although it does not follow directly from the theoretical formulation, I also include UT IL95 in (28) for some regressions as a …rst attempt to explore the sign of ½¯°.
Because high levels of ex-ante output and ex-post abatement would tend to suggest a positive correlation between production and abatement costs, the sign of the coe¢cient of UT IL95 in (28) should serve as a …rst indication of the sign of ½¯°. 41 Finally, NAT GAS is a time-variant dummy variable that equals 1 if the source is burning natural gas. Based on Montero et al. (2002) , who showed that the TSP program has had virtually no e¤ect on …rms' decisions to switch to natural gas, I include this variable to control for the lower production costs that sources may enjoy after switching to this fuel. Since these lower costs should lead to higher utilization, I expect the coe¢cient of NAT GAS to be positive.
Econometric results
To estimate the coe¢cients in (28)-(29), I use a random-e¤ects model. 42 Further, since UT IL and REDUC enter as endogenous variables in (28) and (29), respectively, their correlations with the error terms " it and u it would produce biased OLS estimators. Therefore, I employ a generalized two stage least squares estimation procedure (G2SLS) to obtain unbiased estimates. 43 Based on the data presented in Table 1 , I construct a panel of 407 …rms for years 1996 through 1999. 44 Since I do not have complete information for all …rms in all years the total number of observations reduces to 1253. Summary statistics are reported in Table 2. G2SLS results for both equations (28) and (29) are presented in Table 3a In column (4), I include year dummies to control for exogenous factors that can a¤ect all sources throughout the years (e.g., demand shocks, increase in enforcement capabilities, etc.).
While the coe¢cients of UT IL and REDUC remain positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero, the coe¢cients of the year dummies in the reduction equation show a rather unilateral reduction of emission rates overtime which can be attributed to a combination of more e¤ective enforcement, availability of natural gas at low prices and the increase of emergency episodes of bad air quality during which most polluting sources (i.e., those with higher emission rates) must shut down operations momentarily.
In a further e¤ort to control for the evident increase in compliance after 1996, in column (5) I present results for a panel of a subset of 360 …rms for years 1997 through 1999. Results are similar to those in column (4) Because our theoretical model assumes that all …rms are expected to produce, on average, the same amount of output, E[q p ] = (P ¡ vx s )=c, one can argue that our previous results either underestimate or overestimate the true value of v by not taking into account the fact that …rms are of di¤erent sizes (i.e., di¤erent F LOW RT E). One could further argue that the true value of v is likely be smaller (in absolute terms) and perhaps positive because of the negative sign of F LOW RT E (or LOGF LOW ). To explore this possibility, I treat each source with F LOW RT E¸1500 as a group of identical smaller sources of size F LOW RT E = 1000.
Accordingly, I replicate each observation in the 97-99 panel by the closest integer resulting from the fraction F LOW RT E it =1000. 45 The G2SLS results for this new panel of 4355 observations are in column (6) . 46 Finally, I provide a …rst approximation for the sign of ½¯°by including UT IL95 in (28).
Results are in column (7) . The sign of UT IL95 shows that sources with large ex-ante utilization are less likely to adopt high levels of abatement, suggesting a possible negative correlation between production and abatement costs.
The value of ¢ ps
The above results provide strong evidence that v < 0 and suggest that ½¯°may be negative.
Based on these results and Proposition 1 we cannot conclude whether ¢ ps is positive or negative.
Nevertheless, the econometric results can be used to estimate the magnitude of ¢ ps as follows.
From (18) and (19) it is immediate that
Note that (32) the superiority of the permits policy would be independent of the aggregate emissions goal.
To understand why ¢ ps > 0 requires to recognize the presence of two competing e¤ects.
While v < 0 increases the advantage of the permits policy by bringing output and abatement closer to the …rst-best, ½¯°< 0 reduces such advantage by doing exactly the opposite. In the case of the TSP program both e¤ects tend to cancel out so emissions would be similar under either policy and ¢ ps > 0.
The second e¤ect, however, has still the adverse e¤ect of reducing some welfare under the permits policy. This e¤ect can be empirically estimated by solving the system of equations 
Conclusions and Policy Implications
I have studied the optimal design of second-best environmental policies for a regulator that has incomplete information on …rms' emissions and costs of production and abatement (e.g., air pollution in cities with many small polluting sources). I have considered two of such policies:
tradeable quasi-emission permits and emission standards. I …rst developed a model to show that an optimal permits policy not only provide …rms with abatement ‡exibility but also may create perverse incentives that can shift …rms' output and abatement further away from the …rst-best levels. Thus, in deciding whether or not to implement a permits policy, the regulator will inevitably face a trade-o¤ between abatement ‡exibility and output and abatement misallocation. Because the latter can lead to higher emissions, I do …nd situations in which an optimal standards policy can be welfare superior. However, when I used emissions and output data from Santiago-Chile's TSP quasi-emissions trading program to test for this possibility I found no evidence.
Conversely, I found conclusive evidence that the production and abatement cost characteristics of the sources a¤ected by the TSP program are such that the permits policy is unambiguously welfare superior because not only leads to cost savings but also to the same emissions level than the standards policy. Furthermore, given the signi…cant heterogeneity in compliance behavior across sources, it is reasonable to think that the cost savings has been substantial.
The superiority of the permits policy is due in large part to the fact that sources making larger emission reductions are also increasing their utilization relative to other sources. This behavior seems to be more common than one may think because …rms making larger reductions are generally those choosing abatement alternatives with proportionally large …xed/sunk costs (e.g., installing end-of-pipe technologies) and lower ex-post marginal abatement costs. Therefore, their ex-post total marginal production costs become relatively lower. The empirical analysis also showed a negative correlation between production and abatement cost which has reduced the welfare advantage of the permits policy by approximately 40%.
If we now go back to the question that motivated this paper, I would argue that the theoretical and empirical results presented in the paper make a strong case for the wider use of environmental markets even in those situations in which emissions are imperfectly observed.
In the particular case of Santiago, we would still need to work out the technical details of how to optimally integrate di¤erent type sources under a comprehensive trading scheme so that all trades are done on a one-by-one basis. As shown in the Appendix, it may be optimal to use di¤erent utilization factors for di¤erent type of sources. It is also possible to think of optimal linear schemes to asign the capacity factor as a function of the abatament technology, i.e., e q(x) = a + bx, and of a hybrid instrument that combines trading and standards. I leave these and related design issues for future research.
Appendix: Optimal design for two groups of …rms
Consider that …rms' production costs c can be either c 1 or c 2 with c 1 < c 2 , which the regulator can observe. To simplify notation, I assume …rms are in the same proportion. Following the derivation of (10) it can be shown that the optimal standards policy design is x s1 and x s2 , where
], ¤ j = kc j ¡ v 2 and j = 1; 2. Similarly, from (8) we can obtain expressions for q s1 and q s2 where q sj = (P ¡¯¡ vx sj )=c j .
Deriving the optimal permits policy design, on the other hand, is a bit more involved as it requires to solve for R, e q 1 and e q 2 because now it is optimal for the regulator to use di¤erent utilization factors to estimate quasi-emissions of each type of …rm. Note that …rms continue exchanging permits on a 1 by 1 basis at the market price R. The regulator is simply using additional information in an e¤ort to bring quasi-emissions closer to actual emissions. Since the optimal design would satisfy the …rst-order condition (12) , condition that must hold for all …rms, we have for¯=°= 0 that Re q j = kx sj + vq sj , and therefore
The optimal design requires that after the regulator has "arbitrarily" chosen some value for e q 1 , the value of e q 2 becomes automatically determined by (A1). Since expected output (or utilization) before the regulation is P=c j for a …rm of type j, it is reasonable to ask whether e q 1 =e q 2 ¼ (P=c 1 )=(P=c 2 ) = c 2 =c 1 > 1? By looking at (A1) and expressions for x sj and q sj , it is unlikely to be the case.
Because c 1 < c 2 the intuition would still be that e q 1 =e q 2 > 1. While @x s =@c < 0, @q s =@c is of ambiguous sign, so to …nd out whether e q 1 =e q 2 > 1, we take the derivative of kx s + vq s with respect to c, which is given by , respectively. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Column (7) is omitted since is equal to column (6) . * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Table 3b 
